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Foreword 
Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs) such as terrorists, gangs, transnational 
criminal organizations, and insurgents pose a range of different threats to 
states and to international peace and security.  Few such actors are truly 
global in nature–by reach or influence–just as few states have global 
capabilities.  But many VNSAs are also not simply local or national, as 
illustrated by the case studies in this edited collection.  At the same time 
commentary and reportage on VNSAs tends toward simple dichotomous 
assessments of them being either low-level, relatively unsophisticated, and 
localized threats, or being endowed with capabilities that rival states or 
fictional supervillains that are able to develop or produce weapons  capable of 
achieving mass destruction.  
 
In an era of the super-empowered individual and networks of organizations 
with access to information technology, knowledge, and materials to pursue 
and fulfil their objectives, it is tempting to endow all such actors with the 
potential to supplant the state and its legitimate authority.  Yet, states endure, 
and even failed and failing states are rarely destroyed or replaced by VNSAs.  
States are not always, however, the only or most powerful actors in any given 
locale or region.  Why and how different VNSAs remain low-level and 
localized or undertake and achieve complex engineering tasks in pursuit of 
their objectives are at the heart of understanding the threat environment 
faced by states. 
 
This special edition makes an important contribution to our understanding of 
VNSAs and complex engineering in a number of ways.  First, it takes a wider 
assessment of VNSAs to incorporate more traditional terrorist groups such as 
the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), millenarian cults that turn to 
terrorism such as Aum Shinrikyo, a terrorist-insurgent force that evolved into 
a terrorist-criminal actor such as the Fuerzas Armaadas Revolucionarias 
Colombia (FARC), a listed terrorist entity that holds and administers 
internationally recognized territory (HAMAS), a transnational criminal 
organization and infamous drug cartel (Los Zetas), and the network behind 
some of the more complex proliferation of nuclear weapons material and 
components (A Q Khan Network).  Each actor could be studied by type–
terrorist, insurgency, crime–yet as Ackerman notes in the introduction, the 
respective literatures on terrorism, insurgency, and organized crime to date 
have not directed studies specifically towards complex engineering issues 
undertaken by such groups.  Technology adoption by terrorist groups is 
perhaps the richest vein of literature to date, but even that is merely 
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emerging, as opposed to being accepted and widely adopted.  The wide 
assessment herein is, therefore, a contribution that should appeal to and 
enrich terrorism studies, criminology, science and technology studies, and the 
civil war and insurgency literature.  It also has clear implications for 
intelligence studies and security studies more broadly.  
 
Second, the approach of this collection moves beyond weapons and embraces 
facilitating or logistical aspects that support the operations and objectives of 
the various actors.  While both conventional weapons (PIRA’s mortars) and 
unconventional weapons (Aum’s nuclear and chemical weapons exploits and 
the A.Q. Khan proliferation activity) are addressed here, the use of 
submersibles and submarines to transport narcotics, of secure radio and 
communication networks to coordinate and communicate within a large 
complex organization, and the development of a tunnel network in an urban 
environment to trade and traffic materials, equipment, and personnel 
illustrate the diversity of activity that can be undertaken by VNSAs.  Each, as 
Ackerman and respective authors note, requires technical and engineering 
expertise, expert personnel, organizational support, and resources to 
complete, in addition to a willingness to overcome or circumvent numerous 
obstacles to success.  
 
Third, this collection offers a structured comparison of different types of 
activity among diverse organizations, geographically dispersed and covering 
the last four decades.  The avoidance of overly similar cases allows the authors 
and the editor to identify similarities and differences between and among 
cases.  As the comparative analysis underlines, the ability of any VNSA to 
invest substantial resources, acquire or attain the necessary technical 
expertise, conduct such activity under pressure and in a relatively safe haven, 
and imbue within the organization a culture of learning relies upon multiple 
factors that cut across organizational structure and leadership, geography, 
time, availability of materials, the very culture of the actor and its 
constituents, and the environment in which the VNSA operates.  Here then is 
the clear evidence that not all VNSAs can undertake such tasks, but some 
certainly can and have done so.  The objective of the collection in its simplest 
form–giving ‘pause to those who too easily dismiss the potential threats posed 
by non-state actors’–is therefore achieved with aplomb.  
 
The final contribution of the collection of articles herein lies in its policy-
relevance.  The differences and similarities among the cases all point to the 
need for good intelligence and situational awareness.  At one level, some 
significant issues matter: Resource availability, size, and composition of the 
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organization, and strategy and tactics of the entity.  At another level, more 
granular level information such as attitudes of the leadership toward 
innovation, aversion to risk and/or failure, and the specific technical and 
engineering expertise required to fulfil the task.  The implications of this 
reinforce effective practices of good intelligence such as situational 
awareness, information sharing, all-source analysis, and the ability to detect 
the unusual and consider its implications.  Awareness may not be able to 
prevent the completion of complex engineering tasks, but it should certainly 
permit a countering force to make that task more difficult through the 
identification and manipulation of choke points, development of additional 
obstacles for the VNSA–resources, materials, personnel, risk of detection–
and making the overall operational environment more conducive to the 
tactical failure of the undertaking and/or weapon for the VNSA. 
 
Overall this special edition of the journal builds upon and expands existing 
literature and studies and undertakes scholarly enquiry in a comparative 
manner on divergent issues.  At the heart of this is not weapons or logistics, 
organizations, or cultures, but the confluence of numerous factors that can, 
and arguably must, come together for a VNSA to undertake and complete 
complex engineering activities.  By increasing our awareness of these issues, 
the foundation is laid for more sustained inquiry, further research, and a re-
evaluation of the questions we should be asking vis-à-vis the interests and 
capabilities of Violent Non-State Actors and the threats such actors pose. 
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